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Abstract. The concept of truth has many aims but only one source. The article describes
the primary concept of truth, here called the synthetic concept of truth, according to which
truth is the objective result of the synthesis of us and nature in the process of rational
cognition. It is shown how various aspects of the concept of truth  logical, scientific and
mathematical aspect  arise from the synthetic concept of truth. Also, it is shown how the
paradoxes of truth arise.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Com-
munist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of
experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no
longer exist.
Hannah Arendt
The main topic of this article, the synthetic concept of truth, is described in [ulina, 2020].
In that article the essential role of language in rational cognition is analysed. Although the
synthetic concept of truth is an essential part of that analysis, it is fitted there into a broad
context. Because of the crucial importance of that concept, I thought it would be convenient
to write an article dedicated exclusively to it and its primary role in various aspects of the
concept of truth. To complete the presentation, I have taken some parts from the above
article.
Many of the ambiguities surrounding the concept of truth stem from the fact that the
concept has various aspects that are not sufficiently differentiated. Tarski's T-scheme is a
classic example of this. It is formed by sentences of the form
T(pϕq)↔ ϕ∗
where T is the symbol of the truth predicate, ϕ any sentence of a language L (usually the
language we are considering), pϕq is the name of that sentence in a language ML (usually
the metalanguage in which we consider L), while ϕ∗ is a translation of that sentence into
ML. For a concrete example of a T-sentence, I will take the English sentence "Svrco is afraid
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of thunder" (the language L will be part of the English language ), and my native language
as the language ML:
T(Svrco is afraid of thunder)↔ vr¢o se boji grmljavine
where Svrco is afraid of thunder ∗ = vr¢o se boji grmljavine is a translation of the English
sentence into my native language. Here the concept of truth appears in five places: as the
truth value of the left and right sides of the biconditional, as the truth value of the whole
biconditional, as the meaning of the truth predicate symbol T, and as the truth value of
the sentence "Svrco is afraid of thunder". Only the last sentence belongs to the language
L, while the other sentences and the symbol T belong to the language ML. However, all of
them have a semantic source in the sentence "Svrco is afraid of thunder" of the language L.
The left side of the biconditional through the symbol T allows to speak in ML about the
true value of the sentence "Svrco is afraid of thunder" of the language L, the right side of the
biconditional is related to the true value of the translation of that sentence into ML, while
the truth value of the whole biconditional is related to the success of the translation. Thus,
the key aspect of the concept of truth is related to the truth value of the sentence "Svrco
is afraid of thunder" of the language L, while other aspects are connected to this primary
aspect for various reasons. In what follows, I will focus on this primary concept of truth
 the truth value of the sentences of the language L, leaving aside the truth value of the
metalanguage in which I will carry the considerations. After analysing the primary concept
of truth, I will consider other aspects of the concept of truth.
To determine the truth value of the sentence "Svrco is afraid of thunder" we must know
the meaning of its parts. Knowledge of English grammar tells us which parts they are
and what their linguistic meaning is: "Svrco" is the name of an object, and "is afraid of
thunder" is a predicate expression. However, in order to determine the truth value of the
above sentence, we must know exactly which object the word "Svrco" names and what the
full meaning of the predicate expression "is afraid of thunder" is. Svrco is my only pet,
and every connoisseur of English knows the full meaning of the word "is afraid of thunder",
despite the fact that we do not know clearly enough what the "full meaning of a predicate
expression means. Knowledge of these meanings is necessary but not sufficient to determine
the truth value of the sentence "Svrco is afraid of thunder". We still have to do an appropriate
experiment, let nature give its contribution, to determine that it is a true sentence.
This example illustrates the basic cognitive situation of putting an object a in an inves-
tigative framework (experimental apparatus) that results in one of two possible answers. I
will term such a binary framework a predicate P . We apply the predicate P to an object a
and describe the situation with the declarative atomic sentence P (a). The result can take
two values, yes and no. These are the so-called truth values of the language form P (a)
termed True and False. True and False are designed by us as a part of the binary ex-
periment design and selected by nature in the realization of the experiment. These binary
experiments are the essence of our rational synthesis with nature. We make the question
and offer two possible answers (binary experiment design), and nature selects an answer
(realization of the experiment). The selected truth value is the value of this synthesis which
discriminates what is and what is not. That is why I have termed this primary concept of
truth the synthetic concept of truth.
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The cognitive situation illustrated and described above, simple as it might seem, has
a number of underlying characteristics and assumptions which need to be clarified. First
of all, it reflects our innate approach to the world which we divide into objects (elements
upon which something is done) and into predicates (which determine what is done). This
division is not absolute  something that is a predicate in one context can become an object
to which other predicates are applied in another context. This object - predicate dualism
is a fundamental characteristic of the cognitive framework described here. It is reflected in
language through the structure of the atomic sentence P (a). Symbols a and P  have
different roles in the sentence. We use symbol a to name (mention) an object a. We use
symbol P  to say something about the object a. Because of these different roles, I say that
symbol P  symbolizes a predicate P . To my knowledge, Whorf is the first one to recognise
that the object - predicate dualism is a prominent feature of Indo-European languages: Our
language thus gives us a bipolar division of nature. But nature herself is not thus polarized.
[Whorf, 1940]
A fundamental semantic assumption of the use of the atomic sentence P (a) in rational
cognition is that a names an object. This rests on the assumption that it is possible to
extract from the world something to be named. How we make the extraction and how we
keep the connection between the name and the named in the flow of time is a very complex
subject, and it will not be analysed here. One thing is for certain, the process of naming is
also a kind of our synthesis with nature. I will term the named object the semantic value of
the name.
The next fundamental semantic assumption of the use of the sentence P (a) in rational
cognition is that the predicate symbol P  symbolizes predicate P . This connection between
the language form and reality is even more complex than naming, and it will not be analysed
here. However, from the way we address nature through object-predicate construction it
follows that no predicate is independent of us  it is the product of a cognitive interaction
between us and nature. What is functionally crucial for predicates is that they are the full
meanings of predicate symbols in the sense that they are procedures or processes, binary
experimental frameworks, which applied to each object determine, through the intervention
of nature, the result of the experiment  the truth value of the corresponding atomic sentence.
In other words, we know the full meaning of a predicate symbol, if we know how to apply
it to every object in order to, with the help of nature, get the result, True or False. Thus,
each predicate determines, through the intervention of nature, a mathematical function (in
the mathematical extensional sense) from objects to truth values. I will call this function
the semantic value of the predicate (and of the corresponding predicate symbol). However,
we must not equate a predicate and its semantic value. Otherwise, we would destroy
the whole language mechanism of rational cognition. A predicate is part of the process of
rational cognition while its semantic value is the final result of this process, in which nature
is substantially involved. Reduced to an atomic sentence, it means that the resulting truth
value gives unity to the atomic sentence: it makes the atomic sentence to be something more
than just the concatenation of its parts, the predicate symbol and the name involved in the
sentence.
In his book "Truth and Predication" [Davidson, 2005], Davidson points out the key
problem of "unity of proposition" that the theory of truth and predication must solve. I
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consider this analysis provide the solution. Although I came to this solution in another
way, it can be considered a solution that is obtained when we subtract metaphysics from
Frege's solution [Frege, 1891]. The essential difference between Frege's and my approach
to predicates is that Frege considers predicates (concepts, in his terms) to be metaphysical
entities in the Platonic sense of the word [Frege, 1897, Frege, 1918], while I consider them
to be binary investigative mechanisms that belong to our real activities.
As I have analysed one-place predicate symbols, I can also analyse multi-place predicate
symbols. The analysis of function symbols is similar to the analysis of predicate symbols.
Every function symbol symbolises a function, a procedure that, when applied to objects,
determines an object, with the help of nature. Thus, the semantic value of the function (and
of the function symbol) is the corresponding mathematical (extensional) function between
objects.
To conclude, the essence of the synthetic concept of truth is the following one. By dis-
joining the world into objects and predicates, which we control through names and predicate
symbols, we put binary questions to nature. By selecting one of two offered answers, nature
brings its contribution to the framework, besides its contribution to the processes of naming
and of predicating. In a binary experiment of applying predicate P to object a, when nature
selects an answer, True or False, it says something about itself. With this valuation of
the language form P (a) (which describes and controls the binary experiment), we gain
knowledge about nature. This is the starting point for the overall role of the concept of
truth in our rational cognition.
Clearly, this concept of truth is not any kind of a deflationary conception which says
that a concept of truth is not important. The synthetic conception of truth is of crucial
importance for rational cognition. Also, the synthetic concept of truth is not a kind of
correspondence theory of truth where the truth value of the sentence is determined only by
whether the sentence corresponds with reality or not. In the synthetic conception of truth
the sentence itself, with its truth value, in which nature is essentially involved, forms reality,
which is the result of the synthesis of us and nature.
In what follows, I will analyse other aspects of the concept of truth.
We can build various language structures over atomic sentences. The object-predicate
dualism naturally leads to the first order language, which not only has a simpler and clearer
semantics than other languages, but also proves to be the most important type of logical
language. We can assume that each complex sentence describes a particular experiment
which is a combination of experiments described by atomic sentences. Eg. the sentence
P (a) ∧ Q(b) describes a binary experiment composed of the experiments described by the
sentences P (a) and Q(b). This experiment applied to a and b yields True when both atomic
experiments yield True, otherwise it yields False. This experiment can be considered as
the result of applying a new predicate R to the objects a and b which is defined as follows:
R(x, y) ↔ P (x) ∧ Q(y). Likewise, ∀x P (x) can be considered a new experiment that gives
the value True when for each valuation of the variable x the experiment P (x) gives the
value True, while otherwise it gives the value False. A mathematical (extensional) function
is connected with each linguistic construction of a sentence from simpler sentences. The
function determines the truth value of the constructed sentence on the basis of the truth
values of the sentences from which it is constructed. This connection of truth values gives
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recursive conditions which, together with the truth values of atomic sentences, determine
a unique mathematical function that assigns, in a given evaluation of variables, a truth
value to each sentence. In [ulina, 2020] it is explained why this linguistic construction
over atomic sentences is pleasant, moreover, necessary. Here I would just point out that it
is the result of mathematical modelling of natural language that gives us a language with
precise logic. Thereby, I consider that logic is first and foremost the logic of language,
how we use the language, and how its parts are connected. It means that logic is not
an objective science about propositions, thoughts, absolute truths or some other universal
metaphysical ghosts, but it is a normative science of the organization and use of the particular
language. Among other things, the logic of the first order language consists of the syntactic
structure of sentences and the connection between their truth values. The syntactic structure
is determined by the rules of the construction of more complex sentences from simpler ones,
starting with atomic sentences. In these constructions we use special symbols which identify
the type of the construction. They are logical symbols (connectives, quantors, symbol for
identity), because their semantic values (the corresponding mathematical functions over
truth values) are not determined by the reality (the interpretation) which is the subject
of the language but by their use in the language constructions. This aspect of truth, the
interconnectedness of the truth values of sentences of a language, I will term the logical
aspect of the concept of truth. From this aspect follows a relationship of logical consequence
between sentences, one of the crucial language mechanisms in the development of rational
cognition. Likewise, from this aspect follows the property of the logical truth of a sentence 
it is the sentence whose truth is determined by the organization of the language regardless of
its particular connection with reality. However, what is most important is that, in the given
organization (logic) of the first order language, the truth value of each sentence is entirely
determined by the truth values of atomic sentences. According to the synthetic concept
of truth, the truth values of atomic sentences are primitive semantic elements of language
determined by the process of rational cognition. In this way, the truth value of each sentence
is connected with reality in a completely determined way.
The first order language built upon interpreted atomic sentences has the external as-
sumptions of its use. These are: (i) the fundamental assumption of the language use of
names  every name names an object, (ii) the fundamental assumption of the language use
of function symbols  every function symbol symbolizes a function which applied to objects
gives an object, (iii) the fundamental assumption of the language use of predicate symbols
 every predicate symbol symbolizes a predicate which applied to objects gives one of the
two possible results, True or False, and (iv) the fundamental assumption of the language
use of sentences  every sentence is true or false. In a real process of rational cognition, we
use names for which we do not know completely what they name, predicate and function
symbols for which we do not know completely what they symbolise, and quantified sentences
for which we do not know if they are true or not. However, it is important to emphasize that
regardless of whether the exterior assumptions are fulfilled or not, the logic of the language
demands that when we use the language we assume that they are fulfilled. In thinking itself
there is no difference whether we think of objects that really exist or we think of objects that
do not really exist and whether the predicate symbols we use can be applied to such objects
at all or not. That difference can be registered only in a meeting with reality. Further-
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more, although semantic values of the complex language forms are determined by semantic
values of the simpler forms from which they are built, in the process of rational cognition
we invert this original priority. An assertion about a particular object is more confident and
more determined rational cognition then an assertion about all objects. However, we cannot
apply all primitive (undefined) predicates to all objects, because there are too many objects,
potentially infinitely many. Furthermore, some objects disappear, some come into existence.
So, we cannot know the truth values of all atomic sentences. We rely more and more on
the regularities which we notice. These regularities are formed by universal and existential
sentences (laws). These sentences gradually become the main basis for rational cognition,
although we cannot perform completely the complex binary experiments they determine.
Moreover, these sentences speak often about idealized situations and idealized objects using
idealized predicates. For example, in classical mechanics, we analyse a motion of the so-
called material particles which at each moment of time occupy exactly one point in space.
Hence, we assert something about objects which even do not exist in the strict sense of this
word. We make assertions about such objects without any corresponding atomic sentence
we could verify experimentally. Despite this, such assertions are the result of a deeper anal-
ysis of real situations and, through a kind of synthesis, give us powerful knowledge of real
situations. All this means that our real knowledge, regardless of the degree of its accuracy,
is almost always only a fragment of some assumed semantically complete language. The
whole dynamics of a scientific theory can be understood as the dynamics of completing and
changing an appropriate language. However, this process is not chaotic, but it is, looking
over longer periods, a constant advance in rational cognition of nature. That is because it
has powerful regulatory mechanisms which control and drive it  the exterior interaction
with nature through experiments and the the logic of language. And at the core of these
mechanisms is the synthetic concept of truth. It gives legitimacy and perspective to scientific
research. I will term this aspect of the concept of truth the scientific aspect of the concept
of truth.
I consider mathematics primarily the internal organization of rational cognition. Building
a logical language is one such organization. The first order language is a mathematical model
constructed for the use in rational cognition just like natural numbers are constructed for
counting. So, I consider logic is also part of mathematics. Major mathematical models
arise from intuition about our internal activities and organization. It is from these concrete
activities that the idea of an idealized mathematical world emerges. By choosing names,
function symbols and predicate symbols, as well as setting certain specifications, we shape
the initial intuition into one structured conception. However, here the role of functional
and predicate symbols, as well as the truth values of sentences, is different than in rational
cognition. Predicates are not investigative tool to address questions to nature, there is no
intervention of nature, and thus no synthesizing role of truth values. Because we create
a mathematical world we have a complete control in its design. We determine on which
objects the predicate will give truth, in the same way as we we decide which character in
a fairy tale will be good. For example, we can decide which natural numbers less than
100 will have some (unimportant) property U (we will just enumerate such numbers). So,
in mathematics, predicates are reduced to their semantic values, functions from objects to
truth values. Likewise, when we describe a mathematical world by some set of axioms,
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inferring logical consequences from the axioms, we establish what is true in that world. This
can be very creative and exciting work and it seems that we discover truths about some
existing exotic world, but we only unfold the specification. The inferred sentences are not
true because the world they describe is such, but that world is so conceived that those
sentences are true in it. They are the conditions that this world must satisfy. I will term this
aspect of the concept of truth, as a specification of the imagined mathematical world, the
mathematical aspect of the concept of truth. Since I consider logic to be part of mathematics,
the logical aspect of the concepr of truth is also part of the mathematical aspect of the
concept of truth. I would note that we have already encountered this mathematical aspect
in logic on the example of a linguistic construction using the conjunction ∧. This conjunction
is directly associated with its semantic value, the corresponding Boolean function, without
an intensional intermediate step.
All previous considerations have been done in the appropriate metalanguage whose sen-
tences also have their truth values. Using sentences of the languageML I discussed the truth
values of sentences of the first order language L. The reader will reflect on the correctness
of my considerations, that is, on the truth values of my assertions. The insights she will
thus gain are composed of sentences which also have truth values, which may be the subject
of other sentences. And so on indefinitely. However, since the pattern is repeated in this
infinite regression, it is sufficient to look at one step, the transition from L to ML, that is,
to analyse the connection of the sentences T(pϕq) and ϕ. Without loss of generality, we can
concentrate on the connection between the sentences  Svrco is afraid of thunder is a true
sentence and Svrco is afraid of thunder. The main difference in the use of these sentences
is that when I say Svrco is afraid of thunder, the subject of my expression and thought is
my dog Svrc, and when I say  Svrco is afraid of thunder is a true sentence, the subject
of my expression and thought is the sentence Svrco is afraid of thunder. This is a typical
use-mention distinction. In the first case I use the sentence Svrco is afraid of thunder to
say something about Svrco and in the second I mention the sentence to say something about
it. What is specific here is that we are talking about the truth of that sentence, where each
of the above sentences has its own truth value. If, for example, we were talking about the
number of letters in that sentence, nothing would be disputable. But, as far as the truth
is concerned, there is a difference between the above sentences. I will term it assertion-
valuation distinction. Namely, the very way we use a (declarative) sentence is related to the
transfer of information to consider the sentence true. When we use a sentence, we assert
the sentence  not only do we say it or write it, but we also convey the information that we
consider it true. So, when I assert Svrco is afraid of thunder, I convey the information that
it is a true sentence, and there is no need to assert it in a roundabout way with the sentence
 Svrco is afraid of thunder is a true sentence (by which I again convey the information
that this sentence is true). However, if someone considers the truth of that sentence he will
not use it but will mention it and evaluate its truth. If he concludes that it is true, he will
end his analysis with the assertion  Svrco is afraid of thunder is a true sentence. This
assertion-valuation distinction is a mechanism for stopping or prolonging truth regression.
The assertion aspect stops the regression, and the valuation aspect continues the regression.
So if we agree on something, that's where the regression ends. Usually the regression stops
in the metalanguage because, if disputes do occur, they are disputes about the truth of the
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sentences of the language L and not about the truth of the sentences of the metalanguage,
so they are resolved by the assertions of the metalanguage. If someone disputes what I
have said about the truths of sentences of the language L, he disputes the truth of the cor-
responding ML metalanguage sentence. But the subject of his analysis will again be the
language L and the conclusion he draws will be the assertion of the metalanguage ML and
not its metalanguage MML. As far as I know, the importance of the linguistic mechanism
of assertion was first pointed out by Frege [Frege, 1897].
Regarding the analysis of the concept of truth, the assertion-valuation distinction shows
that truth value occurs in two ways, implicitly as part of an assertion or explicitly through
the truth predicate symbol, i.e. through mentioning the truth value of a sentence. So to
assert the sentence T(pϕq) which explicitly says that the sentence ϕ is true is to assert the
sentence ϕ, and vice versa. If we ignore the translation problems and consider that the
metalanguage ML is an extension of the language L, this means that all T-sentences are
true, that is, to avoid regression, we can assert that for every sentence ϕ of the language L:
T(pϕq)↔ ϕ
The nature of the truth of T-sentences can be viewed in various ways, depending on
how we view the truth predicate through which the truths of the left and right sides of the
biconditional are equated, but they all belong to the mathematical aspect of the concept of
truth.1 It is common to consider each such T-sentence as a partial definition of the truth
predicate. In this case, the T-sentences are analytical truths. So, this is a logical aspect
of the concept of truth. This view is directly related to Tarski's analysis of the concept of
truth, which is more suited to a more general T-scheme T (pϕq)↔ ϕ∗. Tarski's definition of
the truth of the language L in the language ML is a formally correct definition because it
enables the elimination of the defined predicate symbol T in every sentence of the language
ML. The definition is also a materially adequate definition in the sense that all T-sentences
logically follow from it. However, Tarski's definition of truth has the role of a content-wise
definition only when we want to set the truth of the sentences of one as yet uninterpreted
language L by using the truth of the sentences of another language ML. This definition
transfers the meaning, and thus the truth value of the sentence ϕ∗, to the truth of the
sentence ϕ via the appropriate T-sentence. That is why Tarski's definition is so important
in mathematical logic. However, for the interpreted language, it has no content-wise sense
because it defines something that has already been determined. In such a context, this
definition simply gives a translation from the language L to the language ML via the T-
scheme: each sentence ϕ of the language L is translated into the ϕ∗ sentence of the language
ML. If the translation is correct, it preserves the meanings and thus the truth values of the
sentences. In this situation, Tarski's definition is simply a mathematical construction of the
translation function. Thus, it is a mathematical aspect of the concept of truth that makes it
possible to connect the truths of sentences of two different languages. But whether Tarski's
definition is a substantive definition or just a mechanism of translation from one language
to another, it only transfers the problem of the truth of a sentence of one language to the
1If we were to use the more general T-scheme T (pϕq) ↔ ϕ∗ related to a metalanguage that is not an
extension of the language L, due to the question of correctness of translation, the scientific aspect of the
concept of truth would be present, too.
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same problem of the truth of the corresponding sentence of another language. Instead of
examining the truth of the statement Svrco is afraid of thunder, we can now examine the
truth of the statement vr¢o se boji grmljavine. Since the translation is correct, it is one
and the same problem. This is best seen when the metalanguage ML is an extension of the
language L, i.e. when we have a T-scheme T(pϕq)↔ ϕ. Then Tarski's definition translates
the problem of the truth of the sentence Svrco is afraid of thunder to the problem of the
truth of the sentence Svrco is afraid of thunder.
The problem with Tarski's definition of the concept of truth and the interpretation of his
contribution to the analysis of the concept of truth is as follows. Tarski says: We should
like our definition to do justice to the intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian
conception of truth  intuitions which find their expression in the well-known words of
Aristotle's metaphysics: 'To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false,
while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true'. [Tarski, 1944].
However, Frege shows [Frege, 1897] that it is not possible to give an absolute definition of
truth, because the application of such a definition depends on the truth of definiens, so it
is a circular definition. As a special case, he shows that a correspondence theory of truth is
impossible because it reduces the problem is a sentence true to the problem is it true that
the sentence corresponds with reality, which again leads to circularity. Tarski's definition
of the truth of a sentence is not an absolute definition of truth neither does it refine an
intuition about truth as correspondence with reality. It is a relative definition of the truth
of sentences in one language (object language) by the truth of sentences in another language
(usually metalanguage). The definition enables a translation of the truth for sentences
in one language into truth of sentences in another language, as Tarski explicitly states in
his T-convention [Tarski, 1933]. Hence, in Tarski, the intuition about a correspondence
theory of truth is realized as a correspondence of truth between two languages and not
between language and reality. Tarski's recursive definition of truth reduces the truth values
of compound sentences to atomic sentences. Tarski's and the synthetic conception of truth
differ in the way they treat atomic sentences. Tarski finishes his definition by giving a
translation of atomic sentences to metalanguage, and by this transferring the concept of
truth from language to metalanguage. Contrary to this, in the synthetic conception of
truth, the truth values of atomic sentences are undefined primitive elements determined by
the process of rational cognition. In this way, the truth value of every sentence is connected
with reality in a completely determined way. Thus, Tarski's definition of the concept of truth
correctly formulates recursive conditions that connect the truth of a constructed sentence
with the truth of the sentences from which it is constructed, while by translating the truth
of atomic sentences of language L into the truth of sentences of metalanguage it ceases to
be a content-wise theory of truth.
The previous analysis of Tarski's definition also gives the answer about the meaning of
the truth predicate symbol T . The predicate is simply part of the description of the logic of
the first order language L. Just as the syntactic structure of sentences is described starting
from atomic sentences, so the semantic structure of sentences is described starting from the
truth values of atomic sentences. Starting from the truth values of atomic sentences as given,
it is described how the truth values of other sentences are related. Of course, this description
was made in metalanguage using the truth predicate, whether we used the expressions this
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sentence is true or the truth value of this sentence is True. Thus, in the usual case when
the metalanguage is an extension of the language, so there is no problem with the correctness
of the translation, the truth predicate symbol is part of the logical vocabulary of the language
ML, like connectives, quantifiers and the predicate symbol of equality. The only difference is
in universality. The truth predicate symbol for the language L can only belong to languages
that extend the language L in such a way that that the language is part of their domain of
interpretation. As we set, for example, the internal conditions (conditions that are part of
the logic of the language and do not depend on the reality that the language speaks about)
on the truth of the sentence ϕ∧ ψ in relation to the truth of the sentences ϕ i ψ, so we also
set the internal truth condition on the sentence T(pϕq): this sentence is true when ϕ is true
and false when ϕ is false, where ϕ is a sentence of the language L. Thus, the truth predicate
belongs to the logical concept of truth. This also means that all T-sentences T(pϕq) ↔ ϕ,
where ϕ is a sentence of the language L, are logical truths.
This analysis of the truth predicate also shows how the paradoxes of truth arise. It is a
standard situation in science that atomic sentences of the language L have a certain truth
value that is the result of our rational cognition. On the other hand, in the metalanguage
ML we use the truth predicate symbol T to describe the relations of truth values of sentences
of L. So, the truth predicate symbol T for the language L is not part of the language L. Such
a situation does not lead to paradoxes. Namely, according to the previously described truth
condition on the logical symbol T , in order to examine whether the atomic sentence T(pϕq)
of the language ML is true, we need to examine whether the sentence ϕ of the language L
is true, and its truth is completely determined by the truth of the atomic sentences of the
language L. Thus the truth value of the sentence T(pϕq) is unambiguously determined. This
Tarski's solution of the paradoxes of truth, given in [Tarski, 1933, Tarski, 1944], is achieved
by an appropriate syntactic restriction: the metalanguage ML contains the symbol of the
truth predicate of the language L and the language L itself does not contain it. Paradoxical
sentences are simply forbidden by the very syntax of the language. This solution is quite
satisfactory for scientific practice. However, as Kripke has clearly shown in [Kripke, 1975],
natural language does not support such syntactic restrictions. In it the truth predicate is
applicable to all its sentences (L = ML). Now, too, by the truth condition on the logical
predicate of truth, the examination of the truth of the atomic sentence T(pϕq) is reduced to
the examination of the truth of the sentence ϕ, and the examination of its truth is reduced
to the examination the truth of atomic sentences. But now some of these atomic sentences
can again be of the form T(pψq), so that the process does not stop but continues again.
While for the standard language L which speaks of some natural phenomenon and does
not contain its own truth predicate symbol, this procedure gives a unique answer, now we
have no guarantee that the reduction procedure will stop at some step or that we will get
unique truth values of sentences covered by such procedure. Let us consider the two simplest
examples where the truth determination procedure is not successful:
the sentence L: ¬ T(L) (Liar)
the sentence I: T(I) (Truthteller)
For the sentence L we have the following chain of reduction:
L 7→ ¬ T(L) 7→ T(L) 7→ L 7→ . . .
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It is easy to see that no evaluation along this chain satisfies the truth conditions: the
assumption that L is true gives that L is false, and the assumption that L is false gives
that L is true. Thus we cannot assign any truth value to the sentence L. On the other hand,
for the sentence I we get the following chain of reduction:
I 7→ T(I) 7→ I 7→ . . .
Now both evaluations, the evaluation according to which I is true and the evaluation ac-
cording to which I is a false sentence, satisfy the truth conditions along the chain. So, this
sentence can be both true and false in an equally (un)convincing way.
The paradoxes of truth stem precisely from the fact that the classical procedure of de-
termining truth value does not always have to give a classically assumed (and expected)
answer. Such an assumption is an unjustified generalization from common situations to all
situations. We can preserve the classical procedure but we must reject universality of the
assumption of its success. The awareness of that transforms paradoxes of truth to normal
situations inherent to the classical procedure.
Both Tarski's and Kripke's solution to the paradoxes of truth is a normative rather than
an analytical solution: both solutions ensure that paradoxes do not occur, but they do not
explain why they occur. Tarski's solution [Tarski, 1933] consists of retaining classical seman-
tics and restricting the T-scheme: we can speak of the truth of sentences of a language only
in an adequate metalanguage. This solution corresponds to the idea of reflexivity of think-
ing and has proved extremely fruitful for mathematics and science in general. But it is of a
normative nature  the paradoxes of truth are avoided in a way that paradoxical sentences
cannot be expressed in such language at all. It also appears too restrictive because for the
same reasons no situation can be pronounced in which there is a circular reference of one sen-
tence to the truth of other sentences, no matter how common and harmless such a situation
may be. Kripke in [Kripke, 1975], on the other hand, showed that there is no natural restric-
tion on the T-scheme but that it should be accepted in full. However, the riskiness of the
sentences should also be accepted, the possibility that under certain conditions the sentences
do not have a classical truth value. This leads to the study of languagese with three-valued
semantics. Kripke did not provide a specific model but a mathematical framework for ex-
amining various models  each fixed point of any monotonous three-valued semantics can be
a model for the concept of truth. This solution is also of a normative nature  paradoxical
sentences can be expressed and contradictions are avoided by considering some sentences
indeterminate. None of the offered solutions can be an analytical solution until an appropri-
ate analysis of why the paradoxes of truth occur is submitted. Kripke in [Kripke, 1975] also
gave an analytical solution (paradoxical sentences are ungrounded sentences) that leads to
a minimal fixed point of strong Kleene's poisoned semantics.
I consider the previously given analysis to be an analytical solution to the truth paradox,
because it has been shown why they happen. But another important problem remains:
how to insure for the language with its own truth predicate symbol a success of the truth
value determination procedure which is crucial for the validity of classical logic, and in the
same time to preserve the internal semantic structure of the language. The solution, a
language with classical semantics that speaks of its own three-valued semantics, is given
in [ulina, 2001]. It is based on the assumption that paradoxical sentences are meaningful
sentences (finally, we use their meaning in determining their truthfulness) and on the analysis
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of propagation of the failure of the classical procedure in determining their truth values.
In 1991, Milo²evi¢ and Tuman met in Karaorevo, in the former Yugoslavia. They
talked behind closed doors, with no witnesses, and no record was left of the conversation.
Did they then make an agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an agreement
that would take so many human lives and cause so much human suffering? The synthetic
concept of truth gives us the legitimacy to ask that question, and all of the above aspects of
the concept of truth can help us get an answer one day.
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